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Uncertain's motion for summary judgment, concluding that ICEQ
erred in granting the amended permit without notice or opportunity
for a contested-case hearing. The district court further found that
under the statute, TCEQ's executive director did not have authority to
issue the amended permit. TCEQ and Marshall appealed to the
appellate court.
The appellate court distinguished between Marshall's inter-basin
transfer request and its request to change the authorized use.
Regarding the inter-basin transfer request, the court agreed with
TCEQ that the statutory notice and hearing provisions did not apply to
that part of Marshall's application. Thus, the court reversed the
district court's decision on the point of whether the statute required
TCEQ to provide notice and a contested-case hearing for Marshall's
request for an inter-basin transfer. However, the court affirmed the
district court's decision on Marshall's additional request to change the
authorized use from municipal only to municipal and industrial,
holding the statute did apply to that request for a change in use.
Thus, since the notice and hearing requirements applied to part of
Marshall's application, TCEQ should have complied with the statutory
provisions with respect to the application in its entirety.
Uncertain also argued that TCEQ's executive director did not have
statutory authority to grant Marshall's request for an amended permit.
TCEQ had determined that since it was uncontested and did not
require a hearing, the executive director could approve the
application. However, because the court held the application was
subject to the notice and hearing requirements, the application did
require a hearing, and thus TCEQ's executive director did not have
the authority to grant Marshall's request.
Thus, the appellate court reversed the district court on the point
that Marshall's request for an amended permit to authorize an interbasin transfer was not subject to statutory notice and hearing
requirements. The appellate court affirmed the remainder of the
district court's ruling.
KatharineJ.Ellison

City of San Marcos v. Texas Comm'n on Envtl. Quality, No. 03-020072-CV, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 96 (Tex. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2004)
(holding that when a city discharges treated sewage effluent into a
natural flowing stream system, the discharged water-after
commingling with natural waters-may lose all characteristics
distinguishing the effluent as property of the city).
The appellee, Texas Commission on Environmental Quality
("Commission"), has primary responsibility for protecting the
environment and implementing any law and regulations concerning
the environment in the state. On July 2, 1998, the Commission
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granted the City of San Marcos a permit to convey treated sewage
effluent discharged by the City into the San Marcos River to a
diversion point three miles downstream. The Commission placed
several limiting conditions-designed to protect downstream water
users and environmental uses of the river-on the final version of the
permit. The City sought judicial review contesting the imposition of
the limiting provisions on the final permit. In the same action, the
San Marcos River Foundation and Dr. Jack Fairchild (collectively "the
Foundation") challenged the Commission's authority to grant the
permit without requiring the City to first obtain an appropriation
right. The District Court of Travis County affirmed the Commission's
final order granting the permit in its entirety. In a substituted
opinion, the Texas Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the Foundation,
reversed the district court, and remanded with directions to vacate the
City's permit.
The City receives the majority of its municipal water supply from
groundwater from the Edwards Aquifer. For many decades, the City
has discharged the ground water into the San Marcos River once the
water passed through the City's sewage treatment plant. In order to
decrease dependence on groundwater, the City petitioned the
Commission in 1995 for a permit to use the San Marcos River to
convey and divert treated sewage effluent at a point three miles
downstream from the discharge point. The City planned to augment
its potable water supply by piping the water diverted from the San
Marcos River along with water imported from the Guadalupe River to
a drinking water treatment facility currently under construction.
During the application process, both the City and the Commission
relied on the common law rule of capture as applied to groundwater
to support the City's continued ownership of the effluent after
discharge into the San Marcos up to the point where the City intended
to divert the water. The rule of capture as applied to groundwater
provides that no ownership rights exist until the water is pumped from
the ground and placed under the control of the pump owner.
Maintaining ownership rights in captured groundwater requires
exercising continued control over the water. Texas is the only state
that still recognizes the rule of capture as applied to groundwater.
Further, the Commission and the City cited Texas case law that allows
the owner of groundwater to convey the water down a natural
watercourse and divert the water, less any losses due to transportation,
while retaining ownership of the water. Water conveyed in such a
manner is still considered under control of the owner because Texas
law recognizes water as a fungible resource. The exact same water
molecules discharged into the watercourse do not have to be diverted
Applying the above law, the
at the chosen point downstream.
Commission determined that the City maintained control over the
discharged effluent and granted a permit to convey and divert the
treated sewage effluent without requiring the City to apply for an
appropriation permit with the added restrictions of priority of usage.
The appellate court agreed with the Foundation's contention that
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the City's treated effluent was not fungible with the natural waters of
the San Marcos. When the effluent entered the San Marcos and
commingled with the natural flowing waters, which are property of the
State of Texas, the discharged effluent lost all characteristics that
distinguished it as separate property of the City. Therefore, at the
point of discharge, the City lost control and ownership of the formerly
captured groundwater. The City provided further support to the
appellate court's findings by failing to rebut contentions that the City
intended the transportation of the effluent as a preliminary form of
treatment because the commingling would dilute the concentrations
of effluent with the clean natural waters of the San Marcos before the
City treated the water for municipal use. The court continued by
narrowly interpreting cases allowing for water to be treated as a
fungible resource as involving waters of only the purest quality
exceeding that required of sewage effluent.
Since the appellate court ruled to invalidate the City's permit to
convey and divert its sewage effluent, the appellate court did not
address the City's concerns with limiting provisions initially imposed
on the now invalid permit. In recognizing the importance of the
state's scarce water resources, the appellate court stated that similar
plans to reuse effluent would have to be evaluated on a case-by-case
basis. In fact, the Texas Legislature passed a statute giving the
Commission the authority to approve permits exactly like the subject
of this litigation, but the appellate court found the law inapplicable to
the present case because the City's permit was pending prior to the
effective date of the law.
Sean tK Biddle

Maverick County Water & Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. Reyes, No. 0403-00421-CV, 2003 WL 22900914 (Tex. Ct. App. Dec. 10, 2003)
(holding trial court erred in suit for damages caused by flooding
resulting from a broken canal by refusing water district's plea to the
jurisdiction where, as a governmental unit, water district was immune
from suit for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, inverse
condemnation, and nuisance claims).
In April 2000, the manager of the Maverick County Water and
Improvement District No. 1 ("District"), in order to make more water
available for electricity and irrigation, increased the capacity of one of
its canals. On April 8, 2000, the canal broke and released water,
flooding Anita Reyes's property. The District invited Reyes to its April
12 board meeting, where the board president allegedly admitted
liability and promised to pay all damages. After the District informed
Reyes that it had denied her claim, she sued the District for breach of
contract, promissory estoppel, inverse condemnation, and nuisance in
the District Court for Maverick County. The District filed a plea to the
jurisdiction alleging sovereign immunity, which the trial court denied.

